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COMMENTS 
THE JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE AUTOMOBILE 
DEALER FRANCHISE ACT 
In 1956, following well publicized congressional investigations which 
uncovered various methods whereby automobile manufacturers were abus-
ing their dealers,1 Congress attempted to remedy the situation by enactment 
of legislation designed to regulate the dealer-manufacturer franchise agree-
ment. The result was the Automobile Dealer Franchise Act2 (comm.only 
known as the Dealer's Day in Court Act, and hereinafter referred to as 
the "act"), which has been characterized as both a novel approach8 and 
a new departure in the exercise of federal regulation.4 The act gives the 
dealer a federal cause of action for actual damages resulting from the 
manufacturer's failure to act in "good faith" in performing, cancelling, or 
failing to renew the dealer's franchise. As stated in the preamble, the 
purpose of the act was "to supplement the antitrust laws," and "to balance 
the power now heavily weighted in favor of automobile manufacturers."15 
The representatives of the auto industry initially viewed the act with 
a jaundiced eye and warned that this special class legislation6 would rad-
ically change the existing case law by allowing the dealer to win where 
formerly he would have lost. However, the court decisions under the act 
have not borne out such dire predictions. This discussion will examine 
what has, in fact, been the judicial interpretation and treatment of the act. 
I. THE HISTORY AND NATURE OF THE FRANCHISE AGREEMENT 
In the infancy of the auto industry, the manufacturer sold directly to 
the consumer. This method of distribution soon proved inadequate and 
uneconomical because of the consumer's demand for numerous services 
which the manufacturer was not in a position to render and because of 
the extensive capital necessarily tied up in sales outlets.7 The manufac-
turers consequently adopted independent distribution systems under which 
they sold their cars to middlemen or dealers, who, in turn, sold to con-
1 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judidary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); Hearings Before the Antitrust Sub-
committee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 26 (1956). 
2 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1958). Hereinafter, sections referred to in 
text will be those of the act. 
3 Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the 
Judidary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 26, at 46 (1956). 
4 Language of President Eisenhower as he signed the bill into law, 3 U.S. CODE CoNG. 
8e AD. NEWS 4842 (1956). 
5 70 Stat. 1125 (1956). 
6 H.R. REP. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1956). 
7 For a comprehensive study of the economic and legal factors in the development of 
the franchise agreement, see HEwrrr, AUTOMOBILE FRANCHISE AGREEMENTS (1956) [herein-
after cited as HEwrrr]. 
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sumers. In order to escape direct liability through agency,8 the manufac-
turers, in formulating their franchise agreements, specifically designated 
the dealers as "vendees."9 
Because of its success as a method of product distribution, the basic 
form of franchise agreement has remained relatively unchanged to the 
present day. The fundamental contract is quite simple and effective. The 
dealer is granted the exclusive right to sell the manufacturer's automobiles 
in a certain area in return for the latter's promise to cultivate and promote 
consumer choice of the automobiles involved.10 The duration of the fran-
chise agreement is either left indefinite or specified as one or five years.11 
In addition, the agreement usually provides for termination by the manu-
facturer for cause.12 
Prior to the Automobile Dealer Franchise Act most courts held that a 
court or jury could decide whether, in fact, a manufacturer had terminated 
the franchise for good cause.18 Only a few federal courts actually left the 
manufacturer's discretion unfettered.14 As a result, the manufacturers made 
their franchise agreements terminable at will. The courts initially re-
sponded by holding such agreements unenforceable for lack of mutuality.15 
However, long prior to the act, the majority of courts came to view the 
franchise agreement as an enforceable contract terminable at will without 
Iiability.10 
Prior to the act, the courts recognized that the manufacturer was able 
to demand an advantageous agreement because of his superior bargaining 
power,17 but they refused to alter any contract "freely entered into" by the 
dealer.18 As a result, the dealer, fearing the loss of the substantial capital 
8 Joslyn v. Cadillac Auto Co., 177 Fed. 863 (6th Cir. 1910); Columbia Motors Co. v. 
Williams, 209 Ala. 640, 96 So. 900 (1923); Isbell v. Anderson Carriage Co., 170 Mich. 304, 
136 N.W. 457 (1912); Dildine v. Ford Motor Co., 159 Mo. App. 410, 140 S."W. 627 (1911). 
o The manufacturer's liability was not completely eliminated by this change in lan-
guage. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, Ill N.E. 1050 (1916), holding the 
manufacturer liable for defects which made the vehicle "inherently dangerous." 
10 See Note, Dealers Franchise Agreements, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1010 (1950). 
11 Today, the various automobile companies have different lengths of time for their 
franchise contracts, e.g., one-year contract (Ford); five-year contract (General Motors), and 
continuing contract (Ford). 
l:! See HEWITI 242-43, 250. 
13 Shepherd v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 74 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1934); Randall v. 
Peerless Motor Car Co., 212 Mass. 352, 99 N.E. 221 (1912); Holton v. Monarch Motor 
Car Co., 202 Mich. 271, 168 N.W. 539 (1918); Isbell v. Anderson Carriage Co., 170 Mich. 
304, 136 N.W. 457 (1912); see 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 675A (rev. ed. 1936); R.EsrATEMENT, 
CONTRACTS § 265 (1932). 
14 Huffman v. Paige-Detroit Motor Car Co., 262 Fed. 116 (8th Cir. 1919); Oakland 
Motor Car Co. v. Indiana Auto. Co., 201 Fed. 499 (7th Cir. 1912). 
15 Ford Motor Co. v. Kirkmyer Motor Co., 65 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1933); Velie Motor 
Car Co. v. Kopmeier Motor Car Co., 194 Fed. 324 (7th Cir. 1912); see 35 ILL. L. REv. 601 
(1941). 
10 Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 116 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1940); 
Buggs v. Ford Motor Co., 113 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1940); cf. Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 
211 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1954). 
17 Buggs v. Ford Motor Co., 113 F.2d 618, 619 (7th Cir. 1940). 
18 Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 116 F.2d 675, 677 (2d Cir. 1940); 
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invested in his dealership,19 was extremely vulnerable to pressure exerted 
by the manufacturer to increase car quotas, a maneuver which burdened 
the dealer with unwanted cars and parts.20 The franchise had truly be-
come a "contract of adhesion."21 
To strengthen their position, the dealers banded together in the Na-
tional Association of Automobile Dealers, which led the agitation for 
effective legislation.22 Some commentators also aided the movement by 
criticizing the courts' strict adherence to freedom of contract concepts when 
the economic realities indicated that, in fact, the dealers had no such 
freedom.23 It is clearly evident that there was much dissatisfaction with 
the judicial treatment of the franchise contract, which did little to lighten 
the heavy burdens imposed upon the dealer. The advent of legislation 
was no surprise. 
II. STATE AND FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
Prior to the passage of the Automobile Dealer Franchise Act, many 
states enacted statutes with the purpose of limiting the manufacturer's right 
to terminate the franchise. This was to be accomplished by requiring a 
yearly license to do business in the state and refusing to grant such a 
license to a manufacturer who had terminated an agreement without just 
cause.24 Some of the state laws have been held unconstitutional,25 and 
the remaining ones have afforded little protection to the dealers. The acts 
have not usually been interpreted to give a dealer private rights against 
his manufacturer;26 generally they limit only the manufacturer's right to 
terminate and do not apply to non-renewal of a franchise.27 Thus, by 
Ford Motor Co. v. Kirkmyer Motor Co., 65 F.2d 1001, 1005 (4th Cir. 1933). See also Myers 
Motors, Inc. v. Kaiser-Frazer Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 291, 301-02 (8th Cir. 1949); Martin v. 
Ford Motor Co., 93 F. Supp. 920, 921 (E.D. Mich. 1950). 
19 The average dealer has about $118,000 invested in his dealership. H.R. REP. No. 
2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1956). 
20 See United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 
314 U.S. 618 (1941); FTC, REPORT ON THE MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY 1075 (1939). See also 
authorities cited notes 1 &: 3 supra. 
21 See KEssLER, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract, 66 
YALE L.J. 1135, 1156 (1957). 
22 See Kelley, Mutiny of the Car Dealers, Harpers Magazine, August 1956, pp. 69, 
70-71. 
23 See HAMILTON &: AssOCIATES, PRICE AND PRICE POLICIES 69 (1938); Issacs, On Agents 
and "Agencies," 3 HARV. Bus. REv. (1925). See also HEwrrr 207-38. 
24 KY. REv. STAT. §§ 190.010-.080 (1956); MISS. CODE ANN. § 8071.3 (Supp. 1954); N.Y. 
GEN. Bus. LAw §§ 195-98; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 59-1701 to -1720 (Supp. 1956). 
25 ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-1501 to -1526 (Supp. 1955) [Rebsamen Motor Co. v. Phillips, 
289 S.W.2d 170 (Ark. 1956)]: CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-11-1 to -11-18) (Supp. 1955) 
[General Motors v. Blevins, 144 F. Supp. 381 (D. Colo. 1956)]; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46-531 to 
-577 (1950) Uoyner v. Centre Motor Co., 192 Va. 627, 66 S.E.2d 469 (1951)]. 
26 Only two acts have been interpreted to give the dealers private rights. Willys 
Motors, Inc. v. Northwest Kaiser-Willys, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 469 (D. Minn. 1956); Kuhl 
Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 270 Wis. 488, 71 N.W.2d 420 (1955). 
27 Only MINN. STAT. ANN. § 168.27(14)(3) (1961) and WIS. STAT. ANN. § 218.01(3}(a}(l7) 
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providing for short-term franchises, and refusing to renew, the manufac-
turer could easily avoid the statute.28 Since the state legislative efforts to 
improve the condition of the dealer resulted in merely illusory benefits 
in most cases, the dealers successfully demanded federal legislation. 
Prior to World War II, dealers had agitated for federal assistance in 
their struggle with the manufacturers. Congress responded by asking the 
Federal Trade Commission to make an investigation.29 The FTC report 
concluded that the manufacturers were using their great economic power 
to coerce and intimidate their dealers and that the greatest abuse resulted 
from the arbitrary use of the termination clause in the one-sided franchise 
contract which the dealers were forced to accept.30 But no legislation was 
adopted, perhaps because the dealers feared complete government regula-
tion of the industry.31 After the war, the existence of a "seller's market" 
caused the dealers to forget their grievances temporarily, but when the 
market returned to normal, the dealers again turned to Congress, which 
now held its own hearings. The conclusion was that the same conditions 
which had existed at the time of the FTC investigation still prevailed.32 
As a result, Congress passed the Automobile Dealer Franchise Act, giving 
the dealer his much desired "enforceable franchise" and his "day in court." 
III. SCOPE AND CONTENT OF THE ACT 
Section 2 of the act provides that an automobile dealer may bring a 
suit in a proper federal district court against any. automobile manufac-
turer engaged in commerce to recover damages the dealer has sustained 
because of the failure of the manufacturer "to act in good faith in per-
forming or complying with any of the terms or provisions of the franchise, 
or in terminating or cancelling, or not renewing the franchise." The man-
ufacturer is permitted to assert as a defense that the dealer failed to act 
in good faith. Section 3 provides a three-year statute of limitations. Sec-
tion 4 states that the act shall not "directly or indirectly" modify any pro-
vision of the antitrust laws of the United States; and section 5 provides 
that the act shall not invalidate any provisions of state law, except in cases 
of express conflicts. 
It is clear that the dealer's cause of action is based upon a negative 
element: the manufacturer's lack of "good faith." As defined in section l(e), 
good faith is the "duty of each party to any franchise . . . to act in a fair 
(1961) state that nonrenewal without just provocation shall constitute an unfair cancella-
tion. 
28 Such state legislation was the reason General Motors switched from a five-year 
contract to a one-year contract franchise. See BUSINESS RELATIONS INSTITUTE, AUTOMOBILE 
DEALER FRANCHISE AGREEMENTS AND FACfORY-DEAI.ER RELATIONS 23 (1948). 
29 H.R.J. Res. 594, 52 Stat. 218 (1938). 
SO FTC, MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT 153, 1067, 1075 (1939). 
31 For reasons why the dealers reversed their stand, see HEwrrr 109, 266. 
32 H.R. REP. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1956). 
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and equitable manner toward each other so as to guarantee the one party 
freedom from coercion or intimidation from the other party: Provided, That 
recommendation, endorsement, exposition, persuasion, urging or argument 
shall not be deemed to constitute a lack of good faith.'' With such a pro-
vision, Congress hoped to aid and protect the dealer by giving him a potent 
weapon to brandish against the manufacturer's abuse of power. As expected, 
dealers soon instigated suits against virtually all the automobile manufac-
turers. 33 However, the courts have construed and interpreted the act accord-
ing to its literal language, with the result that the manufacturers have 
triumphed in practically every case decided thus far.84 
IV. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE ACT 
To date, the Supreme Court of the United States has not passed upon 
any provision of the act. This can best be explained by its relatively recent 
passage. In fact, only a few appellate courts have ruled on the act.85 Despite 
this paucity of precedent, however, a definite judicial pattern has been 
formed as to several problems under the act. 
A. Constitutionality of the Act 
Most of the early law review discussions of the act suggested that there 
were serious questions as to its constitutionality.86 Thus far, however, the 
38 So far all the five American manufacturers, Ford, General Motors, Chrysler, Ameri• 
can Motors and Studebaker-Packard have been sued under the act as well as foreign 
manufacturers such as Volkswagen and Fiat. For full list of cases, see note 34 infra. 
84 The following cases have been decided under the act to date: Bateman v. Ford Motor 
Co., 302 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1962); Pierce Ford Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 299 F.2d 425 
(2d Cir. 1962); Woodard v. General Motors Corp., 298 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 1962); Fiat Motor 
Co. v. Alabama Imported Cars, Inc., 292 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Blenke Bros. Co. v. 
Ford Motor Co., 217 F. Supp. 459 (N.D. Ind. 1963); Reliable Volkswagen Sales &: Serv. 
Co. v. World-Wide Auto Corp., 216 F. Supp. 141 (D.N.J. 1963); Bateman v. Ford Motor 
Co., 214 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Augusta Rambler Sales, Inc. v. American Motors 
Sales Corp., 213 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Ga. 1963); Sam Goldfarb Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler 
Corp., 214 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Mich. 1962); Milos v. Ford Motor Co., 206 F. Supp. 86 (W.D. 
Pa. 1962); Blenke Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 203 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Ind. 1962); Garvin 
v. American Motors Sales Corp., 202 F. Supp. 667 (W.D. Pa. 1962); Blenke Bros. Motors, 
Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 189 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ill. 1960); Leach v. Ford Motor Co., 189 
F. Supp. 349 (N.D. Cal. 1960); Schnabel v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 
122 (N.D. Iowa 1960); Barney Motors Sales v. Cal Sales, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 172 (S.D. Cal. 
1959); Pinney&: Topliff v. Chrysler Corp., 176 F. Supp. 801 (S.D. Cal. 1959); Staten Island 
Motors, Inc. v. American Motors Sales Corp., 169 F. Supp. 378 (D.N.J. 1959). 
85 Bateman v. Ford Motor Co., 302 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1962); Pierce Ford Sales, Inc. v. 
Ford Motor Co., 299 F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1962); Woodard v. General Motors Corp., 298 
F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 1962); Fiat Motor Co., v. Alabama Imported Cars, Inc., 292 F.2d 745 
(D.C. Cir. 1961). 
86 See Brown &: Conwill, Automobile Manufacturer-Dealer Legislation, 57 CoLUlll. L. 
REV. 219 (1957); Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract, 
66 YALE L.J. 1135 (1957); McHugh, The Automobile Dealer Franchise Act of 1956, 2 
ANTITRUsr BuLL. 353 (1957); Note, 25 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 667 (1957); Note, 70 HARv. L. 
REv. 1239 (1957); Comment, 52 Nw. L. REv. 253 (1957); Note, 9 STAN. L. REv. 760 (1957); 
Note, 26 U. CINc. L. REv. 277 (1957); Comment, 3 WAYNE L. REv. 206 (1957); cf. General 
Motors Corp. v. Blevins, 144 F. Supp. 381 (D. Colo. 1956) (COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-
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manufacturers have not been successful in attacking the act on constitutional 
grounds. In Blenke Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co.,31 for example, defendant 
Ford Motor Company alleged that the act violated the Constitution in 
several respects, thus raising the following issues. 
Whether the Statutory Definition of "Good Faith" Is a Constitutionally 
Ascertainable Standard Within the Meaning of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment.38 In resolving this issue, the court relied on numerous 
instances in which language similar to that used in the definition of "good 
faith" in the act had survived attack under the vagueness doctrine.39 Also, 
an analogy was drawn to the use of such terms as "coerce," "restrain," and 
"good faith" in the National Labor Relations Act.40 Moreover, the court 
noted that the term "good faith" was further limited in the Automobile 
Dealer Franchise Act by the proviso that recommendation, endorsement, 
exposition, persuasion, urging or argument should not constitute a lack of 
good faith. The court reaffirmed the principle that "the requirement of 
reasonable certainty does not preclude the use of ordinary terms to express 
ideas which find adequate interpretation in common usage and understand-
ing."41 Thus the court concluded that "good faith" "conveys sufficiently 
definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common 
understanding and practices."42 
Whether the Act, by Restricting Freedom To Contract, Takes Property 
Without Due Process of Law.43 Citing the famous Nebbia44 case, the court 
determined that there was sufficient public interest to make the action of 
Congress reasonable under the circumstances and not arbitrary or dis-
criminatory. Additionally, the court felt that Congress had an adequate 
reason to limit defendant's freedom to contract in light of the history of 
manufacturers' frequent abuses of the franchise. 
Whether the Act Is Arbitrary and Discriminatory Because, After Pro-
viding That Both Parties Must Act in Good Faith, Congress Granted Only 
the Dealers the Right To Enforce Such Obligations in the Courts. The court 
rejected this argument, saying th~t Congress, in seeking to balance the 
power between manufacturer and dealer, did not deem it necessary to give 
11-14(IO)(a)(d) &: (e) (Supp. 1955) held unconstitutional). See also FTC, REPORT ON THE 
MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY (1939). 
37 203 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Ind. 1962). 
38 Congressional enactments are subject to the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment, which has been construed to require ascertainable standards. See ·winters v. New 
York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948). 
so See Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 231 n.15 (1951). 
40 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (Supp. IV, 1962). 
41 Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 393 (1932). 
42 Blenke Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 203 F. Supp. 670, 672 (N.D. Ind. 1962), quoting 
United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 8 (1947). 
43 Defendant based its argument on the ground that due process of law requires that 
there be no interference by government in private affairs unless the public interest so 
requires, and since there was no overriding consideration of public interest involved, the 
act took defendant's property without due process. 
44 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536 (1934). 
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the manufacturer a right of enforcement because it assumed the manufac-
turer could not be coerced or intimidated by the dealer. Moreover, the 
court pointed out that the manufacturer still retains all of its effective rem-
edies at law. The court concluded that Congress did not act discrimina-
torily or arbitrarily, but, on the contrary, used reasonable means to 
effectuate a legitimate purpose. The only other court to consider the 
constitutionality of the act said in dicta that it felt the act was constitutional 
because a similar state statute had been ruled constitutional.45 These cases 
appear to have fairly well established, at least for the present, the constitu-
tionality of the act. 
B. Good Faith Under the Act 
Several district courts and courts of appeals have construed the act 
according to its literal language, and all have recognized that there can be 
no recovery by the dealer in the absence of actual coercion, intimidation, 
or threats thereof by the manufacturer.46 
In Pierce Ford Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.47 the court looked to the 
act's legislative history and quoted from the House report: 
"The bill, however, does not prohibit the manufacturer from terminat-
ing or refusing to renew the franchise of a dealer who is not providing 
the manufacturer with adequate representation. Nor does the bill cur-
tail the manufacturer's right to cancel or not to renew an inefficient or 
undesirable dealer's franchise."4B 
The court went on to say that, since the act imposes no obligation to pre-
serve an inefficient dealership, it certainly imposes none to accept a dealer-
ship overburdened with liabilities at its inception. In this case, the court 
held that it was not bad faith on the part of Ford to refuse to accept a 
prospective dealer who, in the company's opinion, would incur too great a 
debt in buying the dealership to operate it successfully. Such conduct by 
Ford was held to come within the proviso of section l(e) (defining good 
faith) which states that "recommendation, endorsement, exposition, persua-
sion, urging or argument shall not be deemed to constitute a lack of good 
faith." Hence, a manufacturer may refuse to accept a person as a dealer 
because of an honest belief that the prospective dealer lacks either the 
ability or the financial resources to be a successful dealer. 
In Woodard v. General Motors Corp.49 the court said that the plain 
meaning construction of the good faith definition would give a dealer a 
45 See Garvin v. American Motors Sales Corp., 202 F. Supp. 667 (W.D. Pa. 1962). 
46 Blenke Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 203 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Ind. 1962); Blenke Bros. 
Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 189 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ill. 1960); Leach v. Ford Motor 
Co., 189 F. Supp. 349 (N.D. Cal. 1960); Barney Motor Sales v. Cal Sales, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 
172 (S.D. Cal. 1959); Pinney & Topliff v. Chrysler Corp., 176 F. Supp. 801 (S.D. Cal. 1959); 
Staten Island Motors, Inc. v. American Motors Sales Corp., 160 F. Supp. 378 (D.N.J. 1959). 
47 299 F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1962). 
48 See H.R. REP. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1956). 
49 298 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 1962). 
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cause of action only if the acts of the manufacturer were unfair and inequi-
table and were also coercive. The court quoted the House Report in justifi-
cation for such a construction: "The term 'fair and equitable' as used in 
the bill is qualified by the term 'so as to guarantee the one party freedom 
from coercion' .... "50 Also, the court maintained that it was not strange 
or shocking that Congress should have restricted the cause of action to 
cases involving coercion, since one of the principal evils the act was 
designed to remedy was the exertion of pressure by the dominant automo-
bile manufacturers upon dealers to accept automobiles, parts, accessories 
and supplies which the dealers neither needed nor wanted, and which they 
felt their markets would not absorb.51 In this case, the franchise agreement 
between General Motors and Woodard contained the following provisions: 
"In order to provide product representation commensurate with the 
good will attached to the name 'Chevrolet' and to facilitate the proper 
sale and servicing of Chevrolet motor vehicles . . . dealer will main-
tain a place of business satisfactory as to appearance and location, and 
adequate in size and layout for new car sales operations, . . . and used 
car sales, and will maintain the business hours customary in the trade."52 
"Once Dealer is established in facilities and at a location mutually 
satisfactory to Dealer and Chevrolet, Dealer will not move to or estab-
blish a new or different location . . . without the prior written ap-
proval of Chevrolet.''53 
"If Dealer does not conduct its business in accordance with any re-
quirement set forth [above] ... , Chevrolet may terminate this Agree-
ment by giving to Dealer written notice of termination to be effective 
three (3) months after receipt of such notice.''54 
General Motors cancelled the Chevrolet franchise agreement because the 
dealer, Woodard, had for some time failed to provide or obtain adequate 
facilities. The court found that this action was taken in good faith and 
affirmed summary judgment in favor of General Motors. The court did not 
think that the good faith requirement, whether or not viewed in a context 
of coercion, prevented a manufacturer from terminating a contract with a 
dealer where the dealer had, over a long period of time, violated a valid 
and material clause of the contract and failed to comply with the continuing 
insistence of the manufacturer upon performance. The court also felt that 
the legislative intent underlying the act was not to include a threat of 
cancellation within the proscribed coercive measures if there had been a 
prolonged failure on the part of the dealer to heed the recommendations 
or yield to the legitimate persuasion of the manufacturer. The court said 
the facts showed that for a period of nearly eighteen months General 
50 H.R. REP. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1956). 
51 See S. REP. No. 2073, 84th Cong. 2d Sess. 2 (1956). 
52 Woodard v. General Motors Corp., 298 F.2d 121, 123 (5th Cir. 1962). 
53 Ibid. 
5~ Ibid. 
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Motors, at first patiently and hopefully and later with exasperation and 
despair, cajoled, then exhorted, and finally demanded that adequate facili-
ties be provided. The court concluded that the duty of good faith, how-
ever measured, did not require General Motors to continue the contract 
arrangement for a longer period. 
Recently a federal district court55 neatly described this difficult area by 
saying that the act is not a guarantee against termination of a dealer's 
franchise, but rather the granting of a cause of action for damages, which 
can serve as a guarantee against coercion and intimidation through conduct 
amounting to bad faith.56 The act permits a manufacturer to terminate, or 
to fail to renew, a franchise where the dealer fails to measure up to his 
assigned market potential57 or to keep pace with the other dealers in his 
zone.58 Thus it is not coercion for a manufacturer to insist on his contract 
rights.59 
In light of the foregoing, it seems abundantly clear that the act's good 
faith provision gives the dealer more in the way of protection from the 
manufacturer's misbehavior than did prior common-law60 and antitrust61 
remedies. The act prevents the manufacturer from injuring the dealer 
through the use of coercive tactics; but it does not guarantee the dealer 
freedom from the manufacturer's unfair and inequitable behavior which is 
noncoercive. In this respect, the act has thus far been a disappointment to 
the dealers. However, as one of the recent cases indicated, "We have little 
authority to guide us in the question here presented. The act is new and 
answers to questions arising under it have not yet been developed."62 Thus, 
55 Milos v. Ford Motor Co., 206 F. Supp. 86 (W.D. Pa. 1962). 
56 Id. at 93. 
57 Leach v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F. Supp. 349 (N.D. Cal. 1960). 
58 Staten Island Motors, Inc. v. American Motors Sales Corp., 169 F. Supp. 378 (N.J. 
1959). 
59 Only one case seems to have departed from this otherwise unchallenged interpreta-
tion. In Garvin v. American Motors Sales Corp., 202 F. Supp. 667 (W.D. Pa. 1962), the court, 
appearing quite sympathetic to a rural dealer, held that the evidence supported the jury 
finding of bad faith on the part of .American Motors in terminating the dealer, In so 
doing, the court seemingly departed from the vast majority of the courts, which pre• 
sumably would have determined such facts not to be violative of the act as a matter 
of law. 
60 'l'he courts could have implied a good faith limitation since the parties did intend 
to create an enforceable contract. Such an implication is not without precedent in situ-
ations involving agreements quite similar to the dealer's franchise. See, e.g., J. R. Watkins 
v. Rieb, 254 Mich. 82, 235 N.W. 845 (1931); Beebe v. Columbia Axle Co., 233 Mo. App. 
212, 117 S.W.2d 624 (1938). 
61 Prior to the act, the dealer could, and did, bring an action against the manufacturer 
under the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended by the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 
(1914), 15 U.S.C, §§ 1, 2, 15 (1958). Two prime examples of this type of action are Schwing 
Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Co., 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 923 (1956), and 
Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1957). In both 
cases the dealers lost because the court felt that the manufacturer's termination of the 
dealership was a proper exercise of an honest business judgment under the facts of the 
respective cases. 
62 Bateman v. Ford Motor Co., 302 F.2d 63, 67 (3d Cir. 1962). 
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on final analysis, the most that can be said at present is that a trend favoring 
the manufacturer's position has developed in court analysis of the act's 
good faith provision. 
C. Remedies Available Under the Act 
I. Damages 
Assuming the dealer has proved that the manufacturer has acted in bad 
faith, the act provides that the dealer "shall recover the damages by him 
sustained and the cost of suit."63 Since this provision is the only sanction 
provided by the act, the extent to which damages may actually be recovered 
will play a major role in determining whether the manufacturer will elimi-
nate his bad faith practices. 
Under the act, the initial problem to be solved in measuring damages is 
the determination of whether the suit is based upon "bad faith performance" 
or, alternatively, upon "bad faith termination or non-renewal." In the 
former situation, the damage problems will be essentially those present in 
a breach of contract case. Franchise contracts typically do not stipulate the 
number of cars to be delivered by the manufacturer, but only obligate the 
latter to supply the dealer with "such products available in quantities to 
meet Dealer's reasonable requirements in Dealer's area of sales responsi-
bility."64' Faced with such a franchise, some courts have held that the 
manufacturer is liable for the difference between the profits on the number 
of cars actually delivered and the profits on the number of cars he 
would have delivered had he acted in good faith (as used in the common-
law sense of "honesty of intention," not to be confused with the act's 
"good faith").65 To determine how many cars the manufacturer would 
have delivered, the courts will allow evidence of the manufacturer's 
total production, the number of cars distributed to a particular relevant 
area, and the dealer's customary portion of these amounts.66 Since most 
franchise contracts require the dealer to furnish the manufacturer with a 
monthly estimate of the dealer's requirements for the next three months,67 
these reports could be used as additional evidence of what the dealer ex-
pected to receive. In short, the measure of damages for bad faith perform-
ance under the act will be essentially the same as under prior case law. To 
date, no court has considered this particular damage question under the act. 
In a suit involving bad faith termination or non-renewal, the additional 
problem presented is whether there can be a recovery for loss of future 
profits. Basic contract law requires that such damages be foreseeable by the 
as Section 2. 
64' See the standard Chevrolet Motor Division Dealer Agreement, Form No. 65D-T-
202-60, Form No. 65D-T-201 (1960). 
65 Moon Motor Car Co. of New York v. Moon Motor Car Co., 29 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1928); 
Randall v. Peerless Motor Car Co., 212 Mass. 352, 99 N.E. 221 (1912). 
66 Moon Motor Car Co. of New York v. Moon Motor Car Co., supra note 65; Randall 
v. Peerless Motor Car Co., supra note 65. 
61 Chevrolet Motor Division Dealer Agreement, supra note 64, at 4. 
320 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
parties at the time the contract was made and that they be established with 
reasonable certainty.68 Some cases arising before the act indicated that no 
damages were foreseeable, since the agreement itself provided for termina-
tion "at will"; the courts further inferred the words "without liability."69 
However, many franchise agreements provide that upon termination the 
manufacturer will repurchase new cars, specified parts and accessories, and 
recommended signs and tools which the dealer purchased within a specified 
time, and that the manufacturer will assume part of the lease obligation.70 
It might be concluded that the dealer should not recover for any additional 
damage because the failure to stipulate it in the franchise agreement indi-
cates that it was not foreseeable. On the other hand, one of the basic prem-
ises of the act is that dealers have negligible control over contract provisions 
and that it is therefore reasonable to infer that the parties actually consid-
ered the enumerated liability clauses as merely descriptive of the total 
foreseeable damages. In any event, the act's legislative history clearly indi-
cates that recovery was not to be limited to actual damages but was to 
include loss of future profits.71 The dealer's main concern in this regard will 
be to prove and establish future profits with reasonable certainty. The 
essential elements to be proved are the rate of profit, the quantity of goods 
to be sold, and the reasonable period for which the franchise might have 
extended. A good illustration of these concepts in a concrete fact situation 
is provided by Garvin v. American Motors Sales Corp.72 
The jury awarded Garvin, the dealer, 20,000 dollars in damages, and the 
court upheld this award as a reasonable inference from the evidence pre-
sented. In fact, the opinion seems to indicate that the jury was a bit stingy 
and might have been justified in awarding twice as much as they did.73 Al-
though future profits were awarded only for the year following the bad faith 
termination, the court said that the act did not limit such damages to a single 
year and that it was permissible to admit mortality tables as evidence of 
the potential life span of Garvin in case the jury decided that, in the 
normal course of events, the franchise would have been renewed throughout 
his life. In measuring the future profits for the year following termination, 
the court noted that, at termination, Garvin had orders for five automobiles 
and that a reasonable projection into the future, recognizing the consider-
able impact that the Rambler had upon the automobile market generally, 
could well anticipate a sale of at least sixty automobiles within a year. The 
68 Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854); see McCORMICK, DAMAGES 
§ 138 (1935); Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 992 (1952). 
60 See McCORMICK, DAMAGES§§ 25-32 (1935); Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 992, 997-98 &: n.34 
(1952). 
70 See Chevrolet Motor Division Agreement, supra note 64, at 20·26. See also HEwrrr 
160-67. 
71 Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the 
Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 26, at 59-60 (1956). 
72 202 F. Supp. 667 (W.D. Pa. 1962). 
73 The court thought that it could be inferred from the evidence that actual damages 
amounted to $22,500 and that future profits for one year would have amounted to $18,000. 
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court also felt this conclusion was buttressed by the fact that Garvin had 
earned a profit of 3,000 dollars in the two months prior to termination. 
The court pointed out that the dealer is not required to show with exacti-
tude the precise sum he lost, since an exact computation is not feasible. 
Thus the jury may: make a just and reasonable estimate of the damages 
based on relevant data. Also, in such circumstances, where the manufacturer 
by his own wrong has prevented a more precise computation, the jury is 
allowed to act on probable and inferential as well as direct and positive 
proof.74 Certainly, the thought of a Garvin court coupled with a jury 
sympathetic to the local dealer is not pleasant for those representing the 
manufacturer's interests. But because Garvin is the only case that has even 
reached the damage issue, its authority is perhaps limited. 
2. Injunction 
A careful reading of the act's legislative history provides no indication 
that the subject of supplemental equitable relief was considered by Con-
gress. Does this mean that the statutory right to damages is exclusive, so 
that the dealer cannot enjoin the manufacturer from terminating the 
franchise, pending the damage action on the merits? The answer is clearly 
"No" in light of Bateman v. Ford Motor Co.75 
In Bateman the dealer asked for a preliminary injunction to restrain the 
manufacturer from terminating the franchise while the suit for damages 
was being litigated. The district court refused to grant this relief, holding 
that the statutory remedy was exclusive.76 On appeal, the Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded,77 agreeing with the dealer 
that a court should exercise its equitable powers to make the statutory relief 
more effective. The court noted that article III, section 2 of the Constitu-
tion provides that the judicial power of the United States applies to all 
cases "in Law and Equity" and that from the very beginnings of equity one 
of the purposes of action by the chancellor was to make effective rights given 
by the law.78 Since the purpose of the act was to balance the power which 
was earlier heavily weighted in favor of the manufacturers, the court 
thought that to accomplish this goal the dealer should be given equitable 
assistance in keeping his business going while his legal claim is being tested. 
The court felt that a judgment for damages acquired years after a dealer's 
franchise had been taken away and his business obliterated was small con-
solation. Thus the bare fact that Congress by statute has provided for a 
74 Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251 (1946). 
75 302 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1962). 
76 Bateman v. Ford Motor Co., 202 F. Supp. 595 (E.D. Pa. 1962). 
77 302 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1962). On remand the district court held that defendant had 
not acted in bad faith and denied the petition for a preliminary injunction. 214 F. Supp. 
222 (E.D. Pa. 1963). 
78 This general equitable power of the court to give injunctive relief to make more 
effective a remedy provided by law is long established and well known. See 4 POMEROY, 
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1338 (5th ed. 1941). 
322 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
right at law without express provision for injunctive relief does not preclude 
the exercise of the general powers of a court of equity. 
Does this decison compel a manufacturer to carry a dealer's franchise 
indefinitely? Obviously, the answer must be "No." As the court in Bateman 
put it, "A franchise is not a marriage for life.''79 If the dealer loses on the 
damage action, he will no longer be protected. Also, the bond given by the 
dealer to secure the injunction may prove an embarrassing burden if he 
cannot maintain his case. In short, a dealer's injunction will hurt only the 
manufacturer who has acted in bad faith. 
D. Jurisdiction and Venue Problems Under the Act 
The act provides that a dealer may sue "any automobile manufacturer 
engaged in commerce" in any district court of the United States in the 
district in which the manufacturer "resides, or is found, or has an agent, 
without respect to the amount in controversy ... :•so 
I. Manufacturer Defined 
Section l(a) of the act defines an automobile manufacturer as any form 
of business enterprise engaged in the manufacturing or assembling of passen-
ger cars, including any corporation which "acts for" and is under the 
"control" of such manufacturer in connection with the distribution of 
automotive vehicles. In Barney Motor Sales v. Cal Sales, Inc.,81 a Triumph 
Motor Car dealer sued a corporation engaged in the distribution of Stand-
ard-Triumph automobiles in certain western states. The manufacturer of 
Standard-Triumph automobiles was an English corporation with no interest 
whatever in the defendant distributing corporation. Defendant, maintain-
ing that its own franchising arrangements with the ultimate retail dealers 
were exempt from the coverage of the act, moved for summary judgment 
on the ground that it was not a manufacturer as contemplated by the 
terms of the act. The court denied this motion and permitted the dealer 
to introduce evidence to demonstrate that the defendant was dominated by 
the acts of the actual manufacturer, and that the failure to renew the 
franchise agreement was in bad faith. Otherwise, reasoned the court, the 
actual manufacturers could perpetuate their bargaining domination with-
out the risk of legal recourse by the simple device of operating through 
in~ermediary agencies such as the defendant. Thus, the power to exact any 
terms could itself be used to compel the middleman to pass on such terms 
to the ultimate dealer. The court felt that the essence of the act was to 
break this chain of domination, whether forged of one link or of many. 
The court then laid down the rule that when the instrumentality used to 
exact onerous conditions of continuing in the automobile retailing business 
is "acting for" the manufacturer in the sense that he is employed by the 
79 302 F.2d 63, 66 (3d Cir. 1962). 
so Section 2. 
81 178 F. Supp. 172 (S.D. Cal. 1959). 
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manufacturer, willingly or unwillingly to bring about the condition of 
subservience forbidden by the act, the instrumentality is itself a part of the 
manufacturer and is bound by the act's requirement of good faith. The 
court was quite mindful that this doctrine of pseudo-respondeat superior 
would initially, impose a hardship on the middlemen, but it reasoned that 
as soon as the exploitation of the dealer by the middleman-distributor is 
thwarted, the unfortunate squeeze on the distributor will cease. Thus a 
possible circumvention of the act by manufacturers has been eliminated. 
2. Place of Proper Venue 
Under the act, the manufacturer can be sued where he "resides," "has an 
agent," or "is found."82 Clearly, the former two places of laying venue refer 
respectively to the manufacturer's state of incorporation and any place 
where the manufacturer has a bona fide agent as tested by principles of 
common-law agency. However, the third place of venue, where the manu-
facturer is "found," is less certain. Perhaps the first step one should take in 
attacking this semantic difficulty is to note the great similarity between the 
act's venue provisions and those found in section 4 of the Clayton Act.83 If 
the word "defendant" is substituted for the word "manufacturer," the venue 
requirements are identical. In construing section 4, the term "found" has 
generally been equated with "doing business,''84 which has been defined by 
a great many courts. Assuming federal law is controlling, 85 the matter of 
"doing business" will be governed by the standards of "fair play and sub-
stantial justice."80 Using these basic principles, the court in Fiat Motor Co. 
v. Alabama Imported Cars, Inc.81 held that the relationship between Fiat 
and one of its wholesale distributors, the latter having its principal place of 
business in the District of Columbia, subjected Fiat to service in the District. 
Here Fiat, a New York corporation with its principal place of business in 
New York City, imported Fiat automobiles and sold them to distributors, 
one of which was the Roosevelt Automobile Company, a Delaware corpora-
tion with its principal place of business in the District of Columbia. The 
dealer, an Alabama corporation, brought suit under the act against both 
Fiat and Roosevelt in the District of Columbia. Fiat's motion to quash 
service was denied and, on interlocutory appeal, the ruling affirmed. The 
court pointed out that the "Distributor Sales Agreement" to which Fiat and 
Roosevelt were parties manifested a continuing business relationship involv-
82 Section 2. 
83 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958). 
84 See, e.g., United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. 795 (1948); American Football 
League v. National Football League, 27 F.R.D. 264 (D. Md. 1961); Riss & Co. v. Associa-
tion of W. Rys., 159 F. Supp. 288 (D.C. Cir.), motion denied, 162 F. Supp. 69 (D.C. Cir. 
1958); Boston Medical Supply Co. v. Brown & Connolly, 98 F. Supp. 13 (D. Mass. 1951), 
aff'd, 195 F.2d 853 (1st Cir. 1952). 
85 Compare the majority and dissenting opinions in Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, 
Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960). 
so International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945). 
87 292 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1961). 
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ing the supervision and control by Fiat of numerous details of the Roosevelt 
business. Hence, the contacts of Fiat with the District were of such a sub-
stantial, continuing, and direct nature as to warrant the holding that it was 
doing business there in a manner which made it subject to service of process. 
Under the broad theory of minimum contacts,88 it would seem more 
than likely that the manufacturer_ will be "found" wherever the aggrieved 
dealer is located regardless of the fact that the dealer is not an agent of the 
manufacturer and that the manufacturer has no other contacts with the 
state. Thus, if X manufacturer has a franchised dealer, Y, in state A, Y can 
bring suit under the act against X in state A on these facts alone if there is 
valid service of process. 
3. Service of Process and the Antitrust Laws 
Schnabel v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.89 makes it quite clear that the 
act does not provide for extraterritorial service of process as does section 12 
of the Clayton Act.90 In that case the dealer brought a suit in Iowa and 
served the manufacturer and distributor, respectively, in New Jersey and 
Illinois. The court quashed both services, saying that the act does not pur-
port to amend the Clayton Act, for the act specifically provides in section 
4 that "No provision of this Act shall repeal, modify, or supersede, directly 
or indirectly, any provision of the antitrust laws of the United States." The 
court noted that there were sharp conflicts between many of the important 
provisions of the two acts, such as the statute of limitations, damages and 
attorney's fees recoverable, and the provisions relating to venue and process. 
Thus the act does not incorporate by implication any antitrust provisions. 
The act is a separate "supplement" to the antitrust laws and as such must 
be judged by itself. 
V. EFFECT oF THE JumcIAL TREATMENT oF THE AcT UPON OTHER 
INDUSTRIES USING THE FRANCHISE SYSTEM 
Dealer franchises are now the dominant type of contract in the distribu-
tion of such items as farm implements, electrical appliances, tires, pianos, 
petroleum products, radio, television, and wallpaper.91 As in the automobile 
industry, the manufacturer grants to the dealer the right to sell his product, 
generally in defined areas, in exchange for promises to promote and develop 
markets for the product. Some of the legal and economic problems related 
to these non-automotive franchise agreements are similar to those in the 
auto industry.92 It is quite conceivable that courts, in deciding non-automo-
tive franchise cases, may be so influenced by the Dealer's Day in Court Act 
88 For an extension of this principle, see McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 
U.S. 220 (1957). 
89 185 F. Supp. 122 (N.D. Iowa 1960). 
90 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1958). 
91 See HEWl'IT 228. 
92 Ibid. 
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as to require the manufacturer to act in good faith, i.e., to eliminate coer-
cion, intimidation, and threats thereof. However, the concept of freedom of 
contract will probably limit the use of such an analogy to the more egregious 
examples of coercion and otherwise leave the prior case law undisturbed. 
In any event, the judicial treatment of the act might well open the way for 
further federal legislation concerning franchise contracts in general. Thus, 
by writing the act's good faith requirement into every franchise agreement, 
Congress could eliminate many abuses stemming from these contracts of 
adhesion without doing violence to the freedom of contract concept. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Through the Automobile Dealer Franchise Act, Congress attempted to 
give the dealer a "countervailing power"93 to use in his bargaining with a 
manufacturer. In reality the act has not accomplished this objective.94 It 
has, however, limited abuse of power by manufacturers by providing a 
statutory standard of good faith which prohibits coercion, intimidation, or 
threats thereof in the manufacturer-dealer relationship. While the act is 
limited to preventing these three vices and does not prohibit behavior by 
the manufacturer that is merely unfair or inequitable, it does strengthen 
the dealer's relative bargaining power. Perhaps it is well that this is all the 
act does. The concept of freedom of contract should not be encroached 
upon more than is absolutely necessary to adjust gross bargaining inequities. 
The act, as interpreted by the courts thus far, does not pass this limit. 
]. Patrick Martin 
03 See GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING POWER 117, 
119 (1952). 
94 The act fails to give the dealer what he really wants: territorial security and the 
elimination of dealer "bootlegging." For a recent discussion on this subject, see generally 
Heuerman, Dealer Territorial Security and "Bootlegging" in the Auto Industry, 1962 
WIS. L. REv. 486. Bootlegging is the practice of a franchised dealer's selling new cars at 
distress prices to a nonfranchised new car discounter. 
